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CASE COMMENTS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: AD HOC DEVIATION FROM
FEDERAL PROCEDURAL REGULATIONS AS A
VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS
United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954)
Petitioner, a deportable alien, applied for suspension of his deportation order. A hearing officer recommended denial of the application, and this recommendation was adopted by the Acting Commissioner of Immigration. After a further denial by the Board of Immigration Appeals, petitioner sued out a writ of habaes corpus; the
writ was subsequently dismissed. On the day before his scheduled
deportation, petitioner's wife sought a writ of habeas corpus in a
district court, alleging that a list of "unsavory characters" issued by
the Attorney General had caused the Board to prejudge her husband's
petition. In this confidential list were named a number of persons,
including petitioner, whom the Attorney General planned to deport.
Petitioner alleged that the Board's knowledge of the contents of this
document made it impossible for him to secure a fair hearing. The
district judge refused the offer of proof and summarily denied the
writ. The court of appeals affirmed., On certiorari, HELD, a petitioner,
upon proof of his allegations, is entitled to a hearing before the Board
without the burden of previous proscription; since the discretionary
power of the Attorney General 2 is conferred upon the Board, 3 the
failure of the Board to exercise its own independent judgment denied
to petitioner that due process required by the regulations. Reversed,
4
Justices Jackson, Reed, Burton, and Minton dissenting.
It is dearly established that valid administrative regulations have
the force and effect of law5 and, until repealed or modified by the
1206 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1953).
254 STAT. 671 (1940), as amended, 8 U.S.C. §1254 (Supp. 1953).
38 CODE FED. REGs. §§243, 244 (1952).
4The dissenters, at p. 269, thought that habeas corpus was improperly invoked
and that the petitioner had no legal right to a suspension of a lawful deportation
order.
5E.g., Boske v. Comingore, 177 U.S. 459 (1900); Mastrapasqua v. Shaughnessy,
180 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1950); Alexiou v. McGrath, 101 F. Supp. 421 (App. D.C.
1951); In re Briley's Estate, 155 Fla. 798, 21 So.2d 595 (1945); Atkins v. Manning,
206 Ga. 219, 56 S.E.2d 260 (1949).
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administrative agency, 6 are binding on the administrative tribunal as
well as those affected thereby.7 But a procedural regulation cannot
be specifically repealed, changed, waived, or suspended to affect a case
under consideration,8 nor can a long-established rule of procedure be
disregarded to the derogation of rights acquired under the rule. It
logically follows that valid procedural regulations bestow rights upon
persons within their scope. 10 When regulations are ignored the rights
of parties are subverted and the hearing is without due process of
law." An administrative agency may relax or modify its procedural
rules in the cause of justice, and this action is reviewable only upon
a showing of substantial prejudice to the complaining party. 2 By
stressing the reviewability aspect the courts avoid the abstract question
whether the ad hoc deviation is per se a violation of due process.
The protection of the Fifth Amendment is not limited to citizens
of the United States alone but extends to aliens as well. 13 Courts
have stated, however, that an alien seeking entry is entitled only to

observance of the procedures authorized by Congress and that these
procedures are "due process" as concerns the alien.' 4 It appears that
these courts have used the term "due process" as meaning something
less than constitutional due process. Nevertheless, an alien is entitled
oSheridan-Wyoming Coal Co. v. Krug, 172 F.2d 282 (D.C. Cir. 1949), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom. Chapman v. Sheridan-Wyoming Coal Co., 338 U.S. 621
(1950).
SE.g., United States ex rel. Ohm v. Perkins, 79 F.2d 533 (2d Cir. 1935); Sibray
v. United States ex rel. Plichta, 282 Fed. 795 (3d Cir. 1922); People ex rel. Bergquist
v. Gregory, 337 Ill. App. 661, 86 N.E.2d 434 (1949); Mallen v. Morton, 199 Misc.
805, 99 N.Y.S.2d 521 (Sup. Ct. 1950); In re Consumers Power Co., 6 S.E.C. 444
(1939). But cf. NLRB v. Grace, 184 F.2d 126 (8th Cir. 1950); NLRB v. Pacific
Gas & Elec. Co., 118 F.2d 780 (9th Cir. 1941).
sColyer v. Sketfington, 265 Fed. 17 (D. Mass. 1920), rev'd on other grounds sub
norn. Skeffington v. Katzeff, 277 Fed. 129 (1st Cir. 1922); State v. Tri-State Tel. &
Tel. Co., 204 Minn. 516, 284 N.W. 294 (1939); Stanton v. Municipal Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 189 Misc. 782, 75 N.Y.S.2d 732 (Sup. Ct. 1947). But cf. NLRB v. Monsanto
Chemical Co., 205 F.2d 763 (8th Cir. 1953).
DGermania Iron Co. v. James, 89 Fed. 811 (8th Cir. 1898).
loSibray v. United States ex rel. Plichta, 282 Fed. 795 (3d Cir. 1922); Mah
Shee v. White, 242 Fed. 868 (9th Cir. 1917); Germania Iron Co. v. James, supra
note 9.
"United States ex rel. Chin Fook Wah v. Dunton, 288 Fed. 959 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
12NLR.B v. Monsanto Chemical Co., 205 F.2d 763 (8th Cir. 1953).
"3The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86 (1903); Colyer v. Skeffington, supra
note 8.
4
' E.g., United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950); Ekiu
v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892).
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to constitutional due process in deportation proceedings5 and may
insist upon the observance of rules validly promulgated; 6 rules of
procedure constitute, for aliens, that due process of law guaranteed
by the Constitution to all men. 7 The alien is equally protected in a
hearing in which he invokes discretionary relief. S A statutory recital
that discretionary action is final will not bar the alien from resorting
to habeas corpus proceedings when there has been an abuse of discretion'09 or a failure to exercise discretion. 20 Statutes making Attorney General decisions final are intended to preclude judicial review
except by habeas corpus, 21 which may be used to determine if an alien's
constitutional rights have been violated.22
It might be argued that an admittedly deportable alien seeking
suspension of deportation is in the same position as one seeking entry,
and is therefore not entitled to constitutional due process. Even if
the validity of this proposition were assumed, however, observance of
the procedure is necessary to insure the fair treatment intended by
Congress. The argument seems specious, since an alien within the
United States is still within the definition of "any person" as contemplated by the Fifth Amendment. Furthermore, the suspension
proceedings are merely a logical extension of the deportation process,
in the course of which the alien is entitled to constitutional due
process.
One reason why courts strike down ad hoc administrative deviations from procedural rules may be that constitutional principles require that statutes be administered according to law and not according
25United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149 (1925); Ex parte Radivoeff, 278 Fed. 227 (D. Mont. 1922).
sBridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945); see United States ex rel. Bilokumsky
v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 155 (1923).
17Ex parte Radivoeff, 278 Fed. 227 (D. Mont. 1922).
18E.g., Chavez v. McGranery, 108 F. Supp. 255 (S.D. Cal. 1952) (suspension of
deportation); United States ex rel. Giacalone v. Miller, 86 F. Supp. 655 (S.D.N.Y.
1949) (voluntary departure); see United States ex rel. Weddeke v. Watkins, 166 F.2d
369, 371 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 876 (1948) (suspension of deportation);
Kavadias v. Cross, 82 F. Supp. 716, 718 (N.D. Ind. 1948), rev'd on other grounds,
177 F.2d 497 (7th Cir. 1949) (suspension of deportation).
19Cf. United States ex rel. Kaloudis v. Shaughnessy, 180 F.2d 489, 491 (2d Cir.
1950); see United States ex rel. Adel v. Shaughnessy, 183 F.2d 371, 372 (2d Cir. 1950).

20Chavez v. McGranery, 108 F. Supp. 255 (S.D. Cal. 1952).
21Heikkila v. Barber, 345 US. 299 (1953).
22United States ex rel. Weddeke v. Watkins, 166 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1948), cert.
denied, 333 U.S. 876 (1948); see Reynolds v. United States ex rel. Koleff, 70 F.2d
39 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 293 U.S. 590 (1934).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol7/iss3/6

4

Mann: Administrative Law: Ad Hoc Deviation from Federal Procedural Regu
CASE COMMENTS
to the caprice of men.23 Another rationale is the courts' belief that
administrative procedural regulations are the minimum requirements
of fair procedure and that any deviation therefrom raises a conclusive
presumption of unfairness. 2 1 Courts have not always articulated the
elements of due process involved in a particular case, relying instead
upon a finding of "unfair hearing" 25 or "abuse of discretion. ' 21
Nevertheless, procedural due process seems inextricably involved in
many of the cases. It is difficult to perceive the theory under which
a court may strike down an administrative nonobservance of regulations by issuing a writ of habeas corpus unless the court recognizes
that the petitioner has a right to a close observance of the regulations.
This decision is consistent with the American concept of fair play
inherent in procedural due process. Although the power of the
Attorney General is discretionary, once he has indicated by regulations that he will exercise his discretion in a certain manner - through
the Board by quasi-judicial proceedings in the instant case - he should
be bound to exercise his discretion accordingly until a change is effected through promulgation of superseding regulations.
The fact that the Attorney General may review and overturn any
decision of the Board27 does not render an ad hoc deviation any
less arbitrary. The due process principle requires that all of a class,
including deportable aliens, be afforded equal treatment under the
regulations. Whether the Attorney General's action in issuing the
proscribed list is considered as an abuse of his discretion or the alleged action of the Board in prejudging the alien's application is
considered as a failure to exercise its discretion, the effect is the same:
the alien has been denied his right to a fair hearing before the Board
as guaranteed by regulations.
This decision looks beyond the petitioner who presents no overwhelming equities and has scant hope of ultimate success. It
warns over-zealous administrators that arbitrary action in the face
of self-imposed procedures, even though taken under the guise of

"discretion," will not stand the acid test of procedural due process.
JOHN MANN
23See Sibray v. United States ex rel. Plichta, 282 Fed. 795, 798 (Sd Cir. 1922).
24G.LLHORN, ADMINLS-RATivE LAW CASES AND COMMENTS 449 (2d ed. 1947).
25E.g., Mah Shee v. White, 242 Fed. 868 (9th Cir. 1917).
2

8E.g., See Alexiou v. McGrath, 101 F. Supp. 421 (App. D.C. 1951).
See 8 CODE FrD. REGs. §6.01 (h) (1952).

27

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1954

5

